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Abstract: The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game
played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played
by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant
colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval.
The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior.
Keywords: swarm, swarming behavior, foraging, game theory, dynamic game, Nash
equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
Swarm modeling has many application areas ranging from
biological modeling (Gazi (2003)) to optimization (Brat-
ton (2007)) and locomotion design for autonomous systems
(Desai et al (1998)). In this paper, a game theoretical
model is introduced to examine how swarms form as in,
for instance, the foraging behavior of ant colonies or in
platooning of vehicles on automated highways. This is an
individual focused study of swarms that questions whether
a swarm can form in a time interval by non-cooperative
actions of a finite number of individuals or agents.
Game theory, in particular evolutionary game theory, has
been extensively used in analyzing swarm behavior and an-
imal decision making, (Dugatkin (1998), Giraldeau (2000)
and Andrews et al (2007)). The use of game theory in
social foraging, such as in Giraldeau (2000), is limited to
two person games since the objective is to predict and
explain the foraging behaviors of animals while in groups.
Here, we assume that each agent in a group, while in search
of, say, food minimizes its total effort by using the force
it applies as a control input. This leads to an N -person
infinite-dimensional dynamic game, (Basar (1999)), and to
the question of whether this game has a Nash equilibrium
that carries the features of a swarm. An affirmative answer
means that non-cooperative optimization byN individuals
results in a collective behavior, namely swarming behavior.
The swarm behavior is a cluster formed by the aggregation
of animals of same species that move towards a target loca-
tion, for instance, food source. (Vicsek (2010)) The swarm
behavior is modeled here as a noncooperative distributed
optimization realized by each individual. The aggregation
is achieved by attraction and repulsion between individuals
such that they move close to each other without collision.
The answer to whether this kind of swarming occurs
due to Nash equilibrium turns out to be affirmative for
particular individual cost functionals into which artificial
potential energy (Gazi (2003), Gazi (2004)) terms that
represents the trade-off between repulsion and attraction
is incorporated.
2. MAIN RESULTS
A dynamic, infinite-dimensional game played by N agents
in one-dimensional motion is introduced in this section. A
Nash equilibrium of the game is shown to exist for every
specified initial positions for the agents. This equilibrium
displays many known characteristics of a swarm behavior.
Explicit expressions are derived for the swarm size and the
distance of the swarm to the foraging location.
2.1 Problem Definition
One dimensional swarm behavior of N agents, such as
the flocking of ants in a queue, will be modeled as a
non-cooperative, infinite-dimensional dynamic game. It is
assumed that each agent minimizes its individual total
effort in a time interval by controlling its velocity. Using
velocity as a control input ui(t) arises from applying
force in a viscous environment at which particle mass is
neglected (Gazi (2004)). The total work done in a finite
































Here, the first term penalizes the distance to the foraging
location at the final time and serves as a very simple
“attractant/repellent profile,” (Gazi (2004)). The T pa-
rameter is the duration for foraging of the colony, xi(t) is
the position of ith particle at time t and N is the number
of agents. The first term in the integrand gives the attrac-
tion potential energy, and the second term, the repulsion
potential energy. These terms are introduced as a result of
the assumption that each agent measures its distance to
every other agent and optimizes these distances so as to
remain as close as possible to every other agent without
getting too close to any one of them. Introduction of such
terms into the total potential energy and its (cooperative)
minimization have been shown to lead to stable swarms in
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the stability analysis of Gazi (2004). The last term of the
integrand in (1) is the contribution to the total work done
by agent’s kinetic energy. Thus, each agent minimizes its
total effort, total work done, during the foraging process.
The dynamic non-cooperative game played by N agents is
min
ui
{Li} subject to ẋi = ui, ∀i = 1, ..., N. (2)
Other more general and perhaps more realistic cost func-
tionals are not considered here in order to keep the expo-
sition as simple as possible.
The problem that faces each agent is an optimal control
problem and necessary conditions are obtained by Pon-
tryagin’s minimum principle (see Kirk (1970) and by The-
orem 6.11 of Basar (1999)). A Nash equilibrium solution
exists provided the optimal solutions of N agents result,
when simultaneously considered, in well-defined position
trajectories, (Basar (1999), Section 6.3).
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
The existence and the general features of a Nash equilib-
rium of the game (2) is the main result. A Nash equi-
librium, if it exists, is shown in the Appendix to be a
solution of a non-linear differential equation (7) in terms
of positions of the agents. Since this differential equation
does not obey any local Lipschitz condition, the existence
(or uniqueness) of a solution is not evident. The result
below shows that there is at least one solution.
Theorem 1. There is a Nash equilibrium in which the
initial ordering among the N agents in the queue is
preserved during [0, T ]. Let d(0) := max
i,j
|xi(0) − xj(0)|
be the distance between the first and the last agent in
the queue at the initial time. The Nash solution has the
following properties.
P1. The distance between any two agents i, j at time t is
given by
























































sgn[xi(0)− xk(0)], i = 1, ..., N.
P2. The swarm size dmax(t) := max
i,j
|xi(t)−xj(t)| remains






































NT − 1](2N − 2).
The bound is attained if and only if 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ T . Maximum
swarm size is attained at 0 if t∗ < 0 and at T if t∗ > T .





















tonically approaches the origin as t → T and ends up at
the origin as T → ∞. Moreover, as T → ∞, the distances
between the consecutive agents in the queue are the same.
It follows that the non-cooperative game results in a solu-
tion that has the features of a swarm and that the foraging
activity of this swarm is accomplished increasingly better
given sufficient time. The initial ordering of the agents in
the queue is preserved at all times in this Nash solution.
A closer examination of the time t∗ reveals an additional
property of the swarm. If the agents start far apart from
each other at the initial time, then the attraction term
becomes effective and they end up closer together at the
final time. Conversely, if they start close enough together,
then the repellent term is more effective and they end up
more apart from each other at the final time.
Expressions of the resulting optimal control inputs (veloc-
ities) of agents are rather lengthy and are not given here.
However, their plots show that these are smooth functions
of time and remain within reasonable limits.
Note that in defining the game we have not specified
the foraging target (food supply) location but added a
simple quadratic term (attractant/repellent profile) in
the cost functional, which resulted in the swarm getting
progressively closer to the target. The specification of the
origin as the target would mean that each agent knows
the exact target location at the outset. This would define
a different game and will be considered elsewhere.
3. SIMULATION RESULTS
The optimal trajectories for N = 3 agents are plotted to
illustrate our results concerning the swarm size and the
time t∗. The initial positions of the particles are set to
0, 0.2, and 0.5, respectively. The optimal trajectories for
these initial conditions are plotted in Fig. 1, for T = 1. In
this plot, there is no change in the ordering of the agents
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as postulated. The center of the swarm migrates toward 0,
which is the optimal position of the foraging target.
Fig. 2 gives the swarm size, which is the distance between
first and third particles. Here, swarm size attains its
maximum value between t∗ = 0.6004 ∈ [0, T ]. The value
computed by (4) is marked in the figure by a vertical line
and it is observed that the swarm size actually attains its
maximum value at that time. Moreover, the swarm size at
final time is calculated as dmax(T ) = 0.6791, marked in 2
by a horizontal line and it coincides with the actual swarm
size at the final time.




































Fig. 1. Optimal trajectories for three agents.


























Time for maximum swarm size
Swarm size at final time
Fig. 2. Swarm size, time of maximum swarm size, and
swarm size at final time.
4. CONCLUSION
The dynamic game model introduced in this paper can
be generalized in different directions. The one-dimensional
motion considered here can be extended to two and three
dimensional space. Two dimensional extension would be
applicable to, for instance, robot motion planning. The
cost functionals used by the agents and the foraging
terms in them can be made more general to cover other
interesting objectives for each agent. We have assumed
that every agent knows the location of all other agents.
A further extension will be to relax this assumption and
examine whether the game in which every other agent
only knows the location of its adjacent agents has a Nash
equilibrium solution. The main result of this study, that
a swarm behavior can result as a (non-cooperative) Nash
equilibrium of a game played by individuals, is expected
to be true in all those generalizations.
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5. APPENDIX
The optimal control problem that faces the ith agent is
first considered. Introducing the Lagrange multiplier pi(t)



























and the boundary conditions
xi(0) ∈ R, pi(T ) = xi(T ).
Let I denote the matrix with all entries equal to 1. The






























sgn(xN − xj) ]T .
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Here the “signum vector” s is piecewise-constant in the
interval [0, T ] with each constant value obtained by a per-
mutation of entries in [ 1−N 3−N ... N − 3 N − 1 ]T .
This is because its ith entry si =
∑N
j=1,j ̸=i sgn(x
i − xj) is
equal to 2B(i)+1−N , where B(i) denotes the number of
agents behind the agent i and can assume a value between
0 and N − 1. Note that the vector s in (7) originates from
the repulsion terms in the cost functionals so that the
part of the solution obtained with s = 0 will be called











































Here, the partitioned matrix ϕ(t) is the state transition
matrix of (7) when s = 0. Its partitions can be computed
to be given by
ϕij(t) = aij(t) I + bij(t)(I − I); i, j = 1, 2;
a11(t) = a22(t) =
1
2N
[2 + (N − 1)e
√
Nt + (N − 1)e−
√
Nt],






















































Thus, each ϕij(t) is a matrix with identical diagonal and
identical off-diagonal entries. A solution for a given x(0) ∈
R
N of the nonlinear differential equation (7) obeying the
final condition x(T ) = p(T ) is a Nash equilibrium of the
dynamic game (2).
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the existence of a
Nash equilibrium. Suppose that the initial ordering among
agents is preserved so that s(t) = s(0) for all t ∈ [0, T ].































































Using the boundary condition x(T ) = p(T ) in (8) gives
[ϕ11(T )− ϕ21(T )]x(0) + [ϕ12(T )− ϕ22(T )]p(0) +
[ψ1(T, 0)− ψ2(T, 0)]s(0) = 0
which can be solved for p(0) since ϕ12(T ) − ϕ22(T ) is
nonsingular. It follows that there is a candidate solution
of (7) for every x(0). This solution is
x(t) =
{ϕ11(t) − ϕ12(t)[ϕ12(T ) − ϕ22(T )]−1[ϕ11(T ) − ϕ21(T )]}x(0)+
{ψ1(t, 0) − ϕ12(t)[ϕ12(T ) − ϕ22(T )]−1[ψ1(T, 0) − ψ2(T, 0)]}s(0).
(10)
In this expression, the coefficient matrices of x(0) and s(0)
inherit (from ϕij and ψi) the property of having identical
diagonal/off-diagonal entries, which leads to the simple
expression (3) for pairwise distances. A crucial step is to
verify that for any pair i, j
sgn[xi(t)− xj(t)] = sgn[xi(0)− xj(0)] (11)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. To see this, we first note that si(0) −
sj(0) = 2[B(i) − B(j)] so that sgn[si(0) − sj(0)] =
sgn[xi(0) − xj(0)]. Next, we note that vatt(t) > 0 and
vrep(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ], where the positivity of vrep(t)
can be shown, e.g., by examining its derivative. Finally,
∆(T ) > 0 so that (11) holds in the whole interval. This
proves that (10) is indeed a solution. The maximum swarm






















i(0) − sj(0)] is the difference between the
first and last agent’s signum numbers, respectively, N − 1







(2N − 2). (12)
Maximizing this expression, it is easily shown that maxi-
mum is attained at t∗ of (P2) if it falls inside the interval
[0, T ] and at the boundaries if it is outside that interval.
The first expression in (P3) is obtained by evaluating (12)
at t = T . The expression for the swarm center is obtained
from (10) by taking the average of the entries of x(t):
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x̄(t) = (1− t
T + 1
)x̄(0). (13)
Evaluating at t = T , the second expression in (P3) is
obtained. The last property (P4) follows by (13) and by
(3), where i and j are taken as consecutive agents in the
queue, evaluating at t = T and by taking the limit as
T → ∞. 2
Although, we have not resolved here whether any other
Nash equilibrium exists or not, we note that the solution
given in Theorem 1 is actually the unique solution of the
game (2). This will be proved elsewhere.
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